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Abstract
With networks increasing in physical size, bandwidth, traffic volume, and malicious activity, network analysts are experiencing greater difficulty in developing network situational awareness. Traditionally, network analysts have used Intrusion Detection Systems to gain awareness but this method is outdated when analysts are
unable to process the alerts at the rate they are being generated. Analysts are unwittingly placing the computer assets they are charged to protect at risk when they
are unable to detect these network attacks. This research effort examines the theory,
application, and results of using visualizations of fused alert data to develop network
situational awareness. The fused alerts offer analysts fewer false-positives, less redundancy and alert quantity due to the pre-processing. Visualization offers the analyst
quicker visual processing and potential pattern recognition. This research utilized
the Visual Information Management toolkit created by Stanfield Systems Inc. to
generate meaningful visualizations of the fused alert data. The fused alert data was
combined with other network data such as IP address information, network topology
and network traffic in the form of tcpdump data. The process of building Situational
Awareness is an active process between the toolkit and the analyst. The analyst
loads the necessary data into the visualization(s), he or she configures the visualization properties and filters the visualization(s). Results from generating visualizations
of the network attack scenarios were positive. The analyst gained more awareness
through the process of defining visualization properties. The analyst was able to filter the network data sources effectively to focus on the important alerts. Ultimately,
the analyst was able to follow the attacker through the entry point in the network to
the victims. The analyst was able to determine that the victims were compromised by
the attacker. The analyst wasn’t able to definitively label the attack specifically yet
the analyst was able to follow the attack effectively leading to Situational Awareness.
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Developing Network Situational Awareness through
Visualizations of Fused Intrusion Detection System
Alerts
I. Introduction

T

he world is increasingly becoming interconnected through networks. The most
large and complex networks such as those used by the United States Armed

Forces allow enormous amounts of traffic volume to flow through them each day. These
networks are constantly threatened by the malicious activities of outside hackers and
insider threats. The number of network security incidents reported per annum has
increased at an exponential rate [17, 29]. These incidents include, but are not limited
to, network attacks on vulnerable services, data driven attacks on applications, hostbased attacks such as privilege escalation, unauthorized logins, access to sensitive
files, and malware such as viruses, trojan horses, and worms. In 2000, Fullmer et.al
observed on a daily basis that the busiest router of the Ohio State University network
experienced roughly 400 gigabytes of data traffic flow each day representing nearly
600 million data packets [14]. Furthermore, Fullmer pointed out that during Denialof-Service (DoS) attacks, especially SYN floods, the network traffic greatly increased
from the norm previously mentioned [14].
An analyst’s traditional method for monitoring the activities of a network include utilizing a intrusion detection system (IDS). An IDS automates the process
of identifying and responding to malicious activity targeted at computing and networking resources [1, 4, 18]. It is a tool that examines the network traffic that passes
through it against a user-defined set of rules. If a network packet violates these conditions then an alert is stored in a log file and displayed to the IDS console. The
analyst prefers and trusts the IDS because a network packet either is a violation or
it is not, there is no guessing with a properly configured IDS. Currently, it is the
1

responsibility of the analyst to view each IDS alert and make a split-second decision
on whether the new alert is an isolated event or part of a larger event. With each new
alert generated by the IDS, the analyst is developing new, and sometimes changing,
situational awareness in the network domain. Situational awareness (SA) is knowing
what is happening in the environment around you so that you can act appropriately.
SA is important in any domain whether on land, sea, space, or cyber. Additionally,
it is important to note that SA only exists in humans. There are no tools presently
that can form SA, but there are many that support the analyst’s development of SA
in his/her mind.
Currently in the network domain, analysts monitor their large networks and
computer resources using numerous IDSs to perceive the activities in their networks.
It is the analyst’s responsibility to comprehend each IDS alert as it is received and
integrate that perception into the existing situation that he/she must comprehend
entirely. The projection of correct decision-making occurs after the analyst trusts the
situation as it has developed over time. The problem in this process is the reliance on
the human component to perceive and comprehend. The analysts lose the ability to
develop trusted SA when confronted with, as [12] states, “a torrent of data” during
the perception phase that they “may be even less informed than ever before.”
Fusion of network data and use of visualizations are two methods that offer
promising reduction of cognitive processing required by the analyst. With a fusion
process, several forms of network data can be integrated and pre-processed in order
to clean the data so that the analyst receives pertinent data that is not redundant or
false-positive. Fusion process determines the legitimacy of each alert by considering
its significance in respect to the client/host configuration, the network’s mission and
existing cleaned data previously selected as significant. The analyst can trust and
have more confidence in the data if it comes from multiple sources, giving the analyst
more awareness from the network domain. Visualizations allow the analyst to process
information quicker. Data properties can be visualized and processed quicker by the
analyst than the traditional, reading method. Also, visualizations can show patterns
2

of activity that would not otherwise be obvious. Lastly, incorporating the fusion
process into a visualization would allow the analyst to join different data sources
creating a richer data source and greater awareness.
1.1

Purpose and Goals
This research is very important because there is a serious requirement placed on

the network security analysts both commercial and military to safeguard computer
networks to the best of their abilities. These analysts are tasked with having to
transform large volumes of data into sensible information. At this time, their cognitive
abilities are stretched beyond human capability as network scalability and traffic
flow continue to increase at alarming rates. The analyst’s current role in a network
environment is a central one as illustrated in Figure 1.1. Based on Figure 1.1, one
can see that the human component can be a point of failure.

Figure 1.1: Salerno et al. in [23] depict the role of the analyst
in today’s environment. The massive amounts of data being
directed at the analyst are at issue. The analyst is responsible for
all processing of the raw data and some information to form SA
concept(s) of the current situation. The analyst has moments
to do this or else he/she risks losing additional SA.

3

The IDS is a traditional method for monitoring network activity yet it is not
lessening the cognitive strain on the analyst. Often, as mentioned in the introduction,
the IDSs implemented on important computer assets contribute to more strain when
they generate redundant, false-positive or low-priority alert events. Obviously, the
attacker is no help either when he/she purposely generates background noise in hopes
that the attack signature remains clandestine.
The responsibility falls on the researchers not only to find effective and efficient
solutions to this problem but solutions that the professionals can trust. Trust in the
network domain is very important because the analyst must believe in the developing
situation as it unfolds so correct decisions are executed in a timely fashion. The goal of
this research is to show the Information Assurance (IA) community that by reducing
the quantity of raw alert data into important fused alert data then visualizing the new
dataset with a specialized toolkit, that these visualizations are effective in displaying
situational awareness and network analysts can trust the information ascertained from
this system.
1.2

Research Assumptions

1. Fused Alert Data This research assumes the fusion process correctly generated
the fused alert data in the dataset. Each scenario dataset accurately reflects the
known parameters of that scenario.
2. Cyber SA Reference Model This research effort is solely focused on the
Level 2 and above components of the SA Reference Model. We assume that the
lower level components exist. Refer to Section 3.2.1 for more details.
3. Network Analyst This research assumes the analyst has prior knowledge of
the network structure and computer resources. Such knowledge is necessary for
determining resource importance, analyst focus, and damage assessment.

4

1.3

Research Scope

1. Visualization Toolkit The Visual Information Management (VIM) toolkit
engineered during this research was preselected for its ability to handle the
uniqueness of the scenario datasets. Performance metrics will be limited to the
toolkit’s ability to visualize the necessary network context information versus
other toolkits’ visualizations of their datasets.
2. Number of Test Scenarios Currently, the number of unique scenario datasets
is limited and very select. Therefore any results or conclusions from this research
will have to be verified in future research efforts for correctness when more
datasets become available that include a wider range of network attacks.
1.4

Organization
The remainder of this thesis is divided into four chapters. The next chapter

contains four major sections; in-depth discussion of the IDS, other research efforts
in the area of IDSs being engineered to aid the analyst in developing network SA,
the different SA models and the importance of visualizations when developing SA.
Chapter 3 outlines the research methodology to include the boundaries of the problem,
the SA Framework utilized in this research, the scenario datasets, the visualization
toolkit and the network attack scenarios. Chapter 4 analyzes and interprets the
information collected from the visualizations. The last chapter concludes with a
summary of the research conducted, discusses research significance and contributions,
and suggests areas for future research.
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II. Background

T

his chapter is divided into four major sections, each covering a main topic
of interest. The first portion discusses the IDS architecture and classification

in detail. The second introduces three models of SA; Endsley, Joint Director’s of
Laboratories (JDL), and SA Reference. The next section examines the types of visualizations and their uses to convey information more effectively thus enhancing the
analyst’s situational awareness. The last section will highlight other visualization
research currently attempting to improve network SA development in the analyst.
2.1

Intrusion Detection System
In order to monitor a computer network, analysts use a variety of tools yet no

tool is more relied upon than the IDS. This tool automates the process of identifying
and responding to malicious activity directed at or within a network. Depending
on the configuration of the IDS, the alert event could be logged or it can notify the
analyst of the activity or both. It should be noted that a majority of the network
security community refers to IDS alert events as information while this research will
always refer to the alert events as data.
2.1.1

An IDS is composed of several major

IDS Architecture Schema.

functional components, see Figure 2.1. The next subsections discuss the function(s)

Figure 2.1:
In [1], Amoroso et al. illustrate the IDS components and their relationship to each other.
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and purpose of the important components in the IDS in order to understand how it
generates the data.
2.1.1.1 Target System.

The target system refers to the system that

is being monitored by the IDS. Logically, the system is important to the analyst
otherwise the IDS would not be monitoring it. An example of a target system to
monitor would be a internal server hosting a database containing personal medical
records of all retired military veterans.
2.1.1.2 Packet Feed.

This component according to [1] has two pur-

poses. First, it represents a direct connection from the target system to the IDS’s
Processing and System Management components. Second, it constitutes a fundamental choice of data processing. Either the traffic flows to the target system are diverted
to a centrally located data repository for processing or the traffic flows are analyzed
on the target system and the data is sent to the repository post-process.
2.1.1.3 Processing.

This component contains the algorithms that ex-

ercise and manipulate each data packet in the traffic flow trying to determine if the
packet is malicious. These algorithms are also referred to as the attack signatures.
They require simplicity in order to process each data packet quickly and avoid network
flow bottle-necking. In addition, it is disadvantageous to search for any statistical relationships during the processing phase. First, speed is a necessary factor to have
when processing millions of packets each day. Secondly, the rigorous processing required to locate meaningful relationships within the raw data would consume the
target system’s processor time thereby decreasing its productivity. If this algorithmic processing is off-target, then IDS performance is impacted significantly in terms
of responsiveness of the IDS and accuracy of the alert results. The analyst should
perform audits on the performance of the IDS at the device location to ensure peak
performance.
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2.1.1.4 Knowledge Base.

The Knowledge Base of the IDS is considered

the engine of the system. It stores the information about network attacks in the form
of attack signatures, strings and system or user behavior profiles. This component
is of great importance to the IDS therefore should have adequate protection from
network threats. Most importantly, this component must be accessible by the analyst
in order to receive timely signature-based updates for new network attacks.
2.1.1.5 Storage.

Storage is very dependent on the size of the network

that the IDS monitors. As the network expands so should the storage’s capacity.
The storage component has a limited cache to store short-term data concerning an
open session. Event-related sessions are generally archived for future auditing by the
analyst.
2.1.1.6 Alarms/Directives.

As the sensor is processing the target sys-

tem’s traffic flow, an alarm will be generated if an attack signature in the Knowledge
Base flags the data packet as malicious. The alarm notifies the analyst through the
GUI interface. The sensor can be configured to notify other IDSs and IDS Components. The alarm is logged away into a log file for auditing such as network damage
assessment.
2.1.1.7 GUI/Operator Interface.

Amoroso in [1] states that proper

attention must be given to the presentation, combination and representation of the
data to the analyst. Additionally, [1] is correct that visualization is critical in aiding
the analyst to develop network context and SA. However, visualizations of the raw
alert data will not yield large gains for the analyst because without a separate process
focused on the reduction of the data into important or semi-informational data related
to host/network configuration and the network’s mission, the analyst will gain little
focus or context essential to the development of SA.
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2.1.2

IDS Classification.

An IDS is categorized by sensor type, sensor

location and engine methodology. Each type is outlined in the next sections.
2.1.2.1 Network-Based Intrusion Detection System.

This IDS is com-

monly referred as a (NIDS). The analyst positions the NIDS sensors at high traffic
flow congestion points to capture and analyze every data packet for malicious intent.
The most common congestion points of a network are the hubs, network switches and
firewalls that guard the entrance/exit into the demilitarized zone (DMZ). An example
of a NIDS would be Snort. In [16], Snort.org defines Snort as “an open source network intrusion prevention and detection system utilizing a rule-driven language, which
combines the benefits of signature, protocol and anomaly based inspection methods.”
Snort is reportedly the most deployed IDS in the network security community [16].
2.1.2.2 Host-Based Intrusion Detection System.

This category of IDS

is commonly referred as a (HIDS). Within the HIDS category exists subtypes listed
below [6]:
1. File System monitors - Systems checking the integrity of files and directories.
2. Logfile analyzers - Systems analyzing logfiles for patterns indicating suspicious
activity.
3. Connection analyzers - Systems that monitor connection attempts to and
from a host.
4. Kernel based IDSs - Systems that detect malicious activity on a kernel level.
The HIDS consists of a service or agent that searches for intrusions by analyzing
a single host machine’s state and activities such as system calls, application logs, filesystem modifications. Intrusions such as user privilege escalation would cause this
IDS to generate an alert event to the analyst. OSSEC is a scalable, multi-platform,
open source HIDS that has a powerful correlation and analysis engine that monitors
all the host state and activities mentioned above [8].
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2.1.2.3 Protocol-Based Intrusion Detection System.

This category of

IDS is commonly referred as a (PIDS). A common protocol monitored by this IDS
is Secure HTTP (HTTPS). The simpler PIDS will enforce the correct protocol while
a more sophisticated PIDS can learn or be taught the accepted protocol language in
order to recognize unacceptable language. This system is typically installed on the
front-end of the web server in the “interface between where HTTPS is un-encrypted
and immediately prior to it entering the web presentation layer” so that it can monitor
the behavior and state of the communication protocol between the connected device
and the web server [2]. This IDS offers a monitoring technique with greater security
than that of filtering on IP addresses or port numbers. A disadvantage of this IDS
would be that it increases the computing load on the web server.
2.1.2.4 Application Protocol-Based Intrusion Detection System.

This

category of IDS is commonly referred as a (APIDS). An APIDS focuses on the monitoring and analysis on a single application protocol. APIDS are setup between the
process to be monitored and the targeted system(s) analyzing the behavior and state
of the protocol. In [30], Wikipedia.com explains an example of APIDS located between an Apache server and a Database Management System (DBMS) monitoring
the SQL protocol between the DBMS and the database.
2.1.3 Section Summary.

The IDS is a very useful monitoring tool for net-

work analysts. They can be implemented in a variety of locations and configurations
within a computer network. This flexibility gives greater perception coverage of the
network domain of which the analyst monitors. The IDS has a significant role in
developing the analyst’s SA. After explaining what the IDS is and how it works, the
next section discusses SA.
2.2

Situational Awareness in the Network Domain
As previously mentioned in Chapter 1, SA is knowing and understanding your

environment so that you can react appropriately in the near future. Much of the
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research in Network Situational Awareness, such as in [10, 11, 27] relies on Endsley
in [12] defining SA as “the perception of the elements in the environment within a
volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of
their status in the near future.” Currently, SA exists solely in the human observer.
Presently, no tool is able to produce SA to lessen the cognitive strain on the human
observer. However, the human observer uses tools to aid him in developing or comprehending the ever-changing situation. The SA Agent or system should fundamentally
function in the domain as described in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2: Cumiford et al. in [10] display the SA’s role in the
feedback loop. In the ntework domain, the inputs could be alert
events, network activity logs, other computer resource data and
even analyst team members. The analyst processes all the input
and makes decisions that create effects in the world. The world
responds by generating new inputs and the cycle continues.
Within the SA agent, is a feedback loop termed the OODA Loop. Figure 2.3
illustrates the loop and the SA agent’s goal of making the transitions of each recurring
loop quicker and more efficient.
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Figure 2.3:
Boyd et al. in [7] developed the concept to describe any intelligent system and how it interacts with the rest
of the world. The observing and orientation are necessary steps
towards developing a situation. Based on the ever-changing situation, decisions and actions are taken. The desired goal of the
analyst is to make his or her feedback loop as tight as possible
to ensure quicker response. A related goal of the analyst is to
have his or her feedback loop tighter than the attacker’s feedback loop. The concentric loops illustrate the analyst’s OODA
loop improving with each revolution. If the analyst achieves
this goal then the analyst has a better success rate of recognizing and responding to the attacker’s malicious threats. This
process should be done as efficiently as possible in order to gain
decision and control superiority over adversaries.
Based on Endsley’s definition of SA in [12], the following sections will expound
on the importance of Perception, Comprehension and Projection in the network domain as it pertains to the model being discussed. In particular, examples will be given
to demonstrate the role each plays in the analyst’s development of SA.
2.3

Situational Awareness Models
2.3.1

Endsley Model.

Figure 2.4 represents the universal SA framework

applicable to any domain. The top-down model illustrates the dynamic, cognitive
processes. Any component can update any other component that is linked to it. If
examined closely, one notices the simple feedback loop described in Figure 2.2 but
with added complexity of the concepts; Perception, Comprehension and Projection.
Perception is considered Level 1 SA [12]. It is fundamentally required to be
able to perceive the environment. In [22], Salerno relates perception to the basic
12

Figure 2.4: Endsley et al. in [12] show the complete SA model
in a human perspective. It does not offer any insights into the
tools necessary to implement this model in the network domain.
The JDL and Hybrid Models are more appropriate for real-world
implementation of an SA model.
building blocks of comprehension and projection such that without perception, the
probability of developing incorrect SA increases substantially. In the strategic domain,
a popular example of inadequate perception leading to faulty comprehension in the
21st century is that Iraq was a serious threat to United States interests because the
country had possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In [5], the national
security analysts perceived incorrect data leading to lack of understanding of the real
threat Iraq posed ultimately leading our decision-makers to declare war on unjustified
knowledge.
To perceive the network domain, the analyst utilizes an IDS and other network
management devices to monitor activity. IDSs are very useful in this respect but
they are still limited in several ways. First, the IDS is a system that only flags data
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packets that fit one of its signatures or profiles. Most IDSs have no adaptive learning
capability but rather a finite list of signatures that must be updated routinely in order
to remain effective. Second, the analyst is not guaranteed that the IDS will flag all
network attacks because it is impossible to create a finite list of attack signatures that
covers the entire network attack space.
To increase perception in larger networks, analysts will employ several IDSs
from each classification in order to guarantee wider coverage over the network attack
space see Figure 2.5.

Figure 2.5: The coverage gained in the network attack space
by utilizing several IDSs. Overlap that can occur as well. Notice
the coverage will never include the entire space.
The strategy has its own disadvantages. First, due to the redundant IDS overlap,
the alert event generation rate increases so rapidly it overwhelms the analyst with
false-positive and low-priority alert events. The increased alert events can be counterproductive in that they obscure the small subset of high-priority network-warfare
threats occurring at that time hindering the analyst’s comprehension necessary for
situation awareness. The experienced attacker is aware of the analyst’s strategy and
will employ background scanning and attacking to mask the true intentions which are
very precise and small in number. Lastly, given a scenario in which there is a high alert
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event generation rate and the attacker uses a multi-stage approach to compromising
this network, the analyst may notice a single stage but be unable to perceive linking
all the stages together in a timely manner thus misunderstanding the situation and
missing the small response window to react to the threat.
It is a challenge to find the delicate balance of sensor implementation for adequate perception. Each network is unique in this respect. The analyst should routinely
audit the perception sensors for effectiveness because, if not, the analyst can quickly
be inundated so much so that he/she loses all awareness. Figure 2.6 illustrates the
misconception many analysts have regarding the myth that more sensors is directly
proportional to more information.

Figure 2.6: Endsley et al. in [12] point out that increased data
from sensors at the Level 1 SA does not translate equally into
information. At times, the data is redundant and false-positive
becoming counter-productive by obscuring the important data.

In Figure 2.4, without the Level 1 perception, there is no Level 2 comprehension.
One must experience before finding meaning. Using Figure 2.4, Comprehension is the
integration of the current situational awareness with the following:
1. Goals, Objectives and Expectations related to network usage, assets, productivity, efficiency etc.
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2. The analyst’s abilities, training, a priori knowledge and relevant experience.
3. The analyst’s short-term and long-term memory.
4. The network complexity, perception automation, Information Assurance (IA)
tool resources.
The Comprehension phase of SA never terminates. The analyst is continuously
deriving new meaning from the incoming perceptions attempting to determine operationally relevant information in relation to the current situation. This updating of
the network situation must be rapid and seamless because [11] states an analyst “may
have as little as 90 seconds to make a decision regarding whether activity is suspicious
or not.”
The decision-making phase or projection is the Level 3 SA. At this point, the
analyst has updated, truthful situational awareness. In [12], Endsley comments that
a skilled expert in any field makes timely decisions because he/she relies extensively
on the ability to anticipate future events and implications from current events. The
skilled operator is also able to make the correct decision and execute it precisely in
order to maximize the effect in the domain.
2.3.2

Joint Director of Laboratories Model.

Figure 2.7 illustrates the data

fusion model. It is a bottom-top model that functions well for the lower level data
fusion community but it fails to define SA and Threat Assessment. [23] Levels 0 and
1 perform the perception phase of SA.
Level 0 has physical access to the raw data. It also has the capability for
“estimation and prediction of the existence of an object based on pixel signal level
data association and characterization [23]. In Level 1, related data is grouped into
tracks/containers and each track is given a unique identifier. Together, Levels 0 and
1 perform the duties of the perception phase. The initial levels extract the significant
data from the noisy irrelevant data for Level 2, Situation Assessment. Level 2 is
the attempt to refresh outdated information concerning the current situation so that,
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Figure 2.7:
Salerno et al. in [23] display the levels of the
model and the flow of data from one level to the next. Notice
that the data flow is bidirectional meaning any level can progress
or regress depending on the Situation Assessment.
Level 3, Impact Assessment accurately predicts the effects of all planned responses.
Level 4 is process refinement. This enables feedback between levels in both.
Levels 0 and 1 are the most widely implemented levels of this JDL model. In
this research, the fusion process preprocesses the raw alert events into fused data
with added metadata and a hierarchial track structure. The SA Reference Model
in Figure 2.8 utilizes both the JDL and Endsley models to create a comprehensive
Situation Awareness Framework.
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Figure 2.8:
Tadda et al. in [27] define an SA model that
applies to all domains.
2.3.3

SA Reference Model.

Figure 2.8 incorporates both the Endsley and

JDL models into a single system. The Data Collection component has the ability
and knowledge to gather the raw data. The Levels 0 and 1 provide the interface
necessary to collect the raw sensor data and the object events. Once collected, the
data is wrapped into a metadata document structure such as Extensible Markup
Language (XML). In [23], Salerno et al. explain the metadata captures “various
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details such as when the information was collected, what source the information came
from and the format of the data.” In this stage, the parsing and cleansing are necessary
steps. Incomplete, redundant or non-essential data should be removed for clarity. The
focus and goal of the Perception stage should be data reduction towards presenting
important evidence related to the situation to the Comprehension stage.
The Comprehension stage includes the Model Analysis and Knowledge Discovery tools. The Model Analysis component is utilized to determine which portions of
a target model currently exist in the evidence. A determination of a target model
could be accomplished using a technique such as pattern matching. If evidence of a
target model exist beyond a user-defined threshold, this component should provide
that model to the analyst. The SA Reference Model defines a real-time system thus
the determination of the existence of target models needs to be fast, effective, and
efficient. To that end, the Knowledge Discovery component provides the off-line functionality for exhaustive research into learning new models from the evidence. In [23],
Salerno et al. state “[t]hese models have the potential to indicate activities, capabilities and group memberships.” Any new models would be supplied to the analyst
for future usage. The feedback loop connecting the analyst to the Data Collection
and Model Analysis Tools exists for important reasons. First, the analyst using prior
knowledge, experience or insight may recognize additional, potential models from the
current model(s) therefore he/she requires the system capabilities to retrieve such
information from the evidence repository and view those models using model analysis. Lastly, the analyst will be an integral part of the system because, as of yet, no
successful system can imitate the human’s ability to reason and handle incomplete or
uncertain information.
Next, the SA develops in the anticipation phase. Any pertinent information
to the developing situation will be displayed to the analyst so that he/she can make
decisions that are correct and timely. Endsley’s projection of actions and JDL’s
process refinement in Level 4 occur in this stage as well. The analyst is continuously
asking questions such as:
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1. Is the displayed situation model correct?
2. Was the response appropriate?
3. Were there any key indicators in the situation ahead of time to prevent the
situation?
In [23], Salerno et al. illustrates the image of the perfect SA system in any
domain in Figure 2.9. This configuration would accelerate the feedback loop described
in Figure 2.2 because the analyst is not the main focus of all three phases of SA.

Figure 2.9: Salerno et al. illustrate in [23] that the analyst is
supported by a concept presentation engine that is data-driven
by a combination of high-level reports, low-level data objects,
and entities all of which are associated to threat models. The
analyst uses the concepts in conjunction with other knowledge
from current world events, maps, reports etc. to make decisions.
Take particular note of the analyst’s role. He/She is being supported rather than relied on to process raw data, comprehend
SA and project decisions. This is more beneficial to the analyst
than the current SA environment depicted in Figure 1.1
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After explaining the three key models essential to this research, discussion focuses on the benefits of visualizations to display information and current research in
IDS visualizations.
2.4

Why Use a Visualization in the Network Domain?
Visualization is a valuable tool for handling sophisticated data in an operational

domain. The visualization technique “must be scalable, robust, and effectively and
intuitively represent the data and relationships that are relevant to decision making” [13]. In [17, 28], Lakkaraju and Tufte comment that “Humans are by nature
visual beings and are capable of processing large amounts of data through maps and
data plots. In fact, there is no more powerful method of presenting large amounts
of information than through visual data maps.” An effective visualization can offload substantial processing by the analyst thus freeing the him/her to think, develop, or manage the new, current or evolving situation. In addition, [11] states that
“[V]isual data presentation can facilitate the rapid comprehension of a sequence of
interconnected events.” The analyst can use a visualization to trace the attacker’s
path through a network assessing what computer resources may have been compromised through exploitation. This would not be possible for an analyst viewing a
monitor of endless alert events from a traditional IDS. In [3], advantages of utilizing
a visualization are outlined:
1. It allows more resources to be applied to solving the problem at hand. Resources
such as the toolkit discussed in Section 3.2.3 offer significant computing power
to establish information relationships to visualize the network data in multiple
layouts.
2. It reduces the time spent searching for relevant information.
3. It makes patterns and properties easier to recognize.
4. It makes some things obvious especially problems within the data such as quality control. The analyst using his/her knowledge and experience can resolve
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discrepancies in the visualization such as the role of actors based on their alert
activities.
5. It facilitates monitoring of multiple events.
6. It provides an alterable medium that is configurable.
The subsections to follow will discuss the important aspects of a visualization
that should be considered.
2.4.1

Visualization Classification.

The classification of a visualization is

based on the ways the analyst uses it. The categories as mentioned in [11] are monitoring, inspecting, exploring, forecasting and communicating. There is no universal visualization that supports every use equally rather each has its strengths and
weaknesses in each category. If analysts are responsible for multiple categories, they
should expect to use several different visualizations. The visualization categories support Endsley’s stages of SA in different ways. Figure 2.10 highlights the stages each
category operationally supports.
2.4.1.1 Monitoring.

Analysts that use a monitoring visualization are

performing real-time analysis at the perception stage. The visualization must update
with the new data continuously and be able to present the analyst clear and distinct
indicators when activity deviates from established norms. As the deviation from
established norms increases, the analyst’s attention on the associated actors should
increase. The analyst is generally assigned to monitor a specific portion of the network
to lessen cognitive strain on the analyst. The focus of the monitoring is dependent on
the device being monitored as well as being influenced by the analyst’s knowledge and
experience. Things that are monitored can include and is not limited to the number
of connections for each node in the network, the number and state of the services on
each node, the amount of data transferred from an unknown node into the network
or vice versa, the overall number of security events from various IDSs in the network.
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Figure 2.10:
In [11], D’Amico et al. illustrate the various
classifications are cross-referenced with the stages of SA that
they support as well as the type of IA analysis.
2.4.1.2 Inspecting.

Inspection visualizations aid the analyst in search-

ing for specific data to test SA hypotheses. This visualization can support both the
Perception and Comprehension stages because inspection is closely linked to discovery
which leads to an understanding of the situation. Most analysts who are performing
Intrusion Detection are inspecting the network in some manner. During this inspection, the analyst is removing nonessential data thereby reducing the dataset in order
to focus on important details. Visualizations that support Inspection should be able
to display the following as listed in [11]:
1. Many-to-One Connections - many source IPs attempt to connect to one destination IP i.e: Denial of Service.
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2. One-to-Many Connections - a single source IP attempts to connect to many
destination IPs i.e: PortScan.
3. Number of Connections - the number of open connections with an IP. Additionally, the port number of each connection is important to the analyst. An alert
generates if the connection is established on a non-standard port.
4. Amount of Data Transferred - The amount of data exceeds a set limit for that
IP. The data transfer loads between IPs should be discernable by the analyst.
5. Length of a Connection - time length of a connection between two nodes. Alert
generates if the connection time exceeds a set threshold.
2.4.1.3 Exploring.

Exploring visualizations support the Perception

and Comprehension stages. There is no defined direction or method that the analyst
implements to explore the data. The analyst devises new hypotheses without prior
knowledge of the data, instead, he/she is seeking new patterns, trends, oddities that
would relate to existing SA in the comprehension stage. The analyst is influenced
by incoming data and his/her mental model of the cyber domain and the computer
resources in that domain. This exploring is not performed during real-time analysis as
the analyst has little free-time to do much of anything. Exploration would occur during off-line analysis by correlation analysts for knowledge discovery tools as depicted
in Figure 2.8. These analysts tend to observe the network logs spanning several days
to a week searching for interesting trends in activity.
2.4.1.4 Forecasting.

These visualizations support the Projection stage

of SA. Analysts could view a timeline of activity if the current SA progresses without
intervention or a number of future states based on the available courses of action the
analyst has at that time. The visualization is heavily driven by trending, existing
pattern matches and an available model that describes the network. Event sequences
that can be overlaid onto the existing visualization can aid the analyst in predicting
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future actions based on current observations. The sequences can include animations to
give the analyst a notion of time, direction, possible victims for an evolving situation.
2.4.1.5 Communicating.

Communicating visualizations help the non-

analysts, or those not directly knowledgeable of the daily network activity, to make
sense of the network analysis that occurred during the situation. These visualizations support the digestible post-analysis IA audits to superiors and subordinates by
presenting the review of projected course of actions taken in response to a situation.
2.4.2 Filtering.

When developing SA in the network domain, the focus of the

visualization should be to minimize the ‘noise’ within the data. Noise in the network
domain is the redundant, false-positive or low-priority alerts. The visualization should
be continually minimized until only information remains in view. This minimization
processing of the noise is achieved through filtering techniques. Figure 2.11 from [11]
illustrates the benefits of filtering non-essential noise from the visualization.
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(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 2.11:
D’Amico et al. illustrate in [11] the benefits of filtering to reveal
patterns within the data what would otherwise remain visually hidden from the analyst. Part(a) shows a noisy graph of the source and destination Internet Protocol
(IP) alerts. Part(b) shows the noisy graph filtered of the source and destination
alerts where the source IP of the alert received transmitted bytes. Part(c) shows an
additional requirement is given to exclude .mil-to-.mil connections.
By using filters, the analyst can locate and focus his/her attention on important
information more quickly. Dynamic filtering on a visualization allows the analyst to
find patterns in the data that would otherwise be hidden within the myriad of data
as seen in Figure 2.11a. Also, the filtering builds SA context because the analyst has
further defined the domain space of which he/she is viewing as shown in Figure 2.11c.
In this example situation, the analyst gains additional SA by viewing open and active
IP connections between friendly and potentially hostile connections.
2.4.3

Preattentive Processing.

The visualizations in Figure 2.11 are helpful

but are insufficient in a major way. The example visualizations lack preattentive
processing as described in Figure 2.12.
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(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 2.12: In [9], Conti et al. define Preattentive Processing as a human’s ability to rapidly and accurately analyze visual properties of images at a very low level,
without requiring focused attention; it is a fundamental factor in the effectiveness
of visualization systems. (a) Preattentive Processing using Shape and Color to distinguish differences in information. (b) Preattentive Processing using size and shape
orientation to distinguish differences in information. (c) No Preattentive Processing
was used in this visualization. The result is the analyst uses extra cognitive processing
to locate the outlier node.
The visual properties for the visualizations in figures 2.12a and 2.12b were selected with greater care than in Figure 2.12c. Figure 2.12c takes significantly more
time and cognitive effort to locate the outlier. Preattentive processing can benefit
the displaying the network context such as IP address machine-type, friend/foe, alert
priority, or time-elapsed since creation. Special attention should be given to deciding
on the appropriate visual properties because it can be a real benefit to visualizations
that deal with enormous amounts of data. If the toolkit that generated the examples
in Figure 2.11 does not incorporate preattentive processing into its visualizations then
the analyst will lose valuable time attempting to discover these bits of information by
returning to the evidence repository for each IP address. The problem will compound
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on itself as more data enters the visualization over time or the datasets grow very
large.
2.4.4

Focus.

Another key factor for visualizations is keeping focus. Focus

is defined by [9] as seeking “to display more detail about a user-selected focal point
while still maintaining big-picture context.” An analyst gains knowledge of important
details by focusing on a subarea of the visualization but at a cost of visualization
distortion or lost screen space. One method of gaining focus on a subarea of the
visualization is to zoom-in. There are some visualizations that display too much
information such that the analyst has no recourse but to zoom-in. Immediately after
zooming into a subarea, the analyst’s mental recollection of the previous visualization
begins to fade or be replaced rapidly by the new visualization. An analyst will start to
zoom-in and out numerous times to compensate for the context loss. This technique
wastes valuable comprehension time. Additionally, zooming into the visualization
after two or more iterations becomes completely meaningless. If the analyst loses
enough context then he/she can not relate the subarea visualization to the initial
visualization.
2.4.5

Speed.

There is a requirement for speed in every interactive visualiza-

tion. The system response must be quick, within 100 milliseconds according to [9], in
order to keep the analyst immersed in the visualization. Any tasks such as filtering
lasting longer than 10 seconds will cause the analyst to start a new task having lost
attention on the task at hand. If the response time exceeds 10 seconds for any reason,
a progress bar should be displayed as feedback to the analyst.
The Visual Information Management (VIM) toolkit used in this research was
chosen by our AFRL sponsor to visualize the fused alert data. The VIM toolkit
allows the user to configure information sources, visualization layouts and properties
in order to facilitate the analyst’s SA development. To aid the analyst, the VIM
toolkit implements a powerful filtering capability that handles structured, hierarchical
data across multiple visualizations. The toolkit can filter on any attribute defined
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within the fused dataset. For example, the toolkit can clean the data of low-priority
alerts leaving only the higher priority ones. The toolkit can add and remove filters
seamlessly. The visualizations incorporate network context such as IP machine-type
and friend/foe using preattentive processing techniques specifically it uses contrasting
colors to distinguish friend/foe and differing images for the machine-types. These
enhancements lessen the strain on the analyst’s cognitive processes which enables
the analyst to focus on comprehending the network SA. To keep the analyst’s focus,
any drill-down into the hierarchial data opens a new dialog box capable of additional
drill-down capability if necessary. This is helpful so that the analyst can drill-down
into several object entities without losing the knowledge of how those entities interact
in the overall situation context. Additionally, the toolkit attempts to render all the
entity objects and their relationships in a configuration that utilizes space effectively.
If the visualization is larger than the provided window space then the analyst can use
scroll bars to navigate the visualization. Furthermore, to allow for focus on individual
nodes within the visualization, the nodes selected for focusing are enlarged. This helps
the analyst focus on the subarea while not losing the big picture. Lastly, the toolkit
responds quickly to the analyst. The toolkit responsiveness is directly proportional
to the amount of Random Access Memory (RAM) installed in the operating system.
2.5

Current Research in IDS Visualization
The IA research community has sponsored numerous projects that utilize a va-

riety of network data in an attempt to visualize SA in the network domain. Examples
of the network data are IDS alerts, winlog, tcpdump, netflow logs, etc.
2.5.1

VisAlert.

In [18], Livnat et al. created a tool that visualizes the cor-

relation of various IDSs logs. In [13], Foresti adds that the “tool facilitates situational
awareness in complex network environments by provoiding a holistic view of network
security to help detect malicious activities.” The tool is capable of visually displaying
any past IDS or system alerts. The IA monitoring devices are labeled on the outer
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ring. The outer ring also functions as a statistical measurement in that percentage of
circumference around the outer ring edge is directly proportional to the percentage
that a particular alert constitutes in relation to the total number of alerts. The concentric rings represent a user-defined time elapsing for example the outer rings would
be older than the most inner ring. Figure 2.13 illustrates the toolkit is operation as
it visualizes IDS alerts.

Figure 2.13:
In [18], Livnat et al. demonstrate VisAlert reporting a network alert incident.
It does not perform any preprocessing or data cleansing analysis on the alerts
or network traffic. As a result, the toolkit’s single visualization displays alerts and
not information to the analyst. The toolkit’s lack of visualization layout diversity
“decreases the analyst’s ability to create situational awareness and makes a dangerous assertion that a single visualization layout is necessary to display any single or
multi-stage attack effectively” [3]. In [11], D’Amico et al. clearly stated that no single visualization can perform as an effective visualization for all three stages of SA.
Another potential problem with the toolkit is that the visualization is susceptible to
redundant, false-positive, and low-priority alerts cluttering the visualization. The an-
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alyst will be mislead or distracted such that the high-priority network threats remain
hidden from the analyst. Lastly, the visualization can illustrate single-event network
attacks such as DoS on a range of IPs, but it fails to provide the analysis necessary to
link a multi-stage attack. A serious limitation of the tool is it must rely on the analyst
to bridge the information gap by deciding whether two separate network attacks are
related.
2.5.2

PortVis.

McPherson et al. in [20] discuss a visualization tool for

detecting security events through a port-based method. In [20], McPherson et al.
states that the tool uses high-level data for discovering high-level security events. The
tool visualizes total count of activities, not substance of the activities thus analysis is
limited. The toolkit is beneficial because it is capable of injecting traffic signatures into
the network. This offers the analyst the ability to identify suspicious network traffic
and develop threat models as it traverses through the network. Unfortunately, [20]
offers no examples of high-level network threats the tool can visualize only stating
that attackers with small attack signatures would remain clandestine indefinitely. In
addition, the tool does not have any drill-down capability to view lower-level details.
2.5.3

VisFlowConnect.

In [31], Yin et al. state that the tool was “imple-

mented as a demonstration of an efficient and effective visualization of network flows
into and out of a network.” The goal was to visualize the relationships, quantity, and
direction between internal hosts and external machines. The tool utilizes NetFlow network data [31]. First, [31] claims that the visualization improves situational awareness
of current and recent network events through data visualization. The tool visualizes
high-level activity, but it has drill-down capability if the analysts requires it. Patterns
such as asymmetrical traffic volume between two IP addresses is readily apparent in
the visualization. The tool includes a temporal capability in that it can replay past
traffic patterns that provides the analyst additional insight into the network environment. The toolkit includes several different views; Global, Domain, Internal and
Host Statistics. The toolkit includes advanced filtering techniques on ports, protocol,
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transfer rates and packet size. Testing of the toolkit against the Blaster virus showed
promising results in that the SA required minimal investigation in order to determine
the cause of the network attack. The tool generated interesting visualizations with definite patterns when the network attack was DoS. Lastly, the visualization illustrated
patterns that depicted hostile reconnaissance such as port scanning. A disadvantage
of the tool would be the lack diverse network data integrated into the visualizations.
Using additional data sources, the analyst would determine with greater certainty the
origin and type of network attack on the network. Figure 2.14 illustrates the tool in
operation.

Figure 2.14: In [31], Yin et al. highlight the tool in operation.
The visualization appears similar to a parallel-axis graph.

2.5.4

VIAssist.

SecureDecisions Inc. in [24] describe the Visual Assistant

for Information Assurance Analysis (VIAssist) as aiding the analyst through a software architecture framework that integrates numerous types of visualizations into one
toolkit. This research follows the assertions made by [11] that no single visualization
can support all the stages of SA. Instead, the framework is attempting to support
all three stages of SA by incorporating several different visualizations into a single
package. Figure 2.15 illustrates the tool in operation. One can see that there are
many tools incorporated into it.
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Figure 2.15: In [24], SecureDecisions Inc. highlight the tool’s
aggregation of various tools.
2.5.5

NVisionIP.

Through research funded by Security Incident Fusion

Tool (SIFT) at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA), [17]
developed this toolkit for visualizing network attacks. The tool visualizes network
traffic using Argus NetFlow data [17]. The analyst uses network attack attributes
to filter the byte-flow data within the visualization. The tool includes a rich set
of filtering that gives the analyst the additional control necessary to develop SA.
However, the tool’s reliance on Netflow data as the single source of network data
is limiting. Not all network attacks are captured by Argus Netflow data. Another
downside to the toolkit is its reliance on a histogram-like visualization at each level
of focus. As discussed earlier in this chapter, SA context is lost with each focus
context-switch such as a zoom-in selection.
2.5.6

InetVis.

In [21], Riel et al. discuss a 3-D visualization tool that

visualizes the network traffic given a source IP, destination IP, and port number.
The resulting visualization is a 3-D space with colored points suspended to indicate
the data’s location. In [21], it is explained “the visualization is intended for viewing
events traversing a boundary between an internal (home) network versus the external
internet.” The toolkit also maps the ICMP packets in the ICMP plane located under
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the 3-D space. The tool allows the analyst to assign different colors to data variables
such as source IP, destination IP, port number, protocol and packet size. The point
size can be reduced to help alleviate parts of the 3-D from visualization clutter due to
high activity in a specified range. Lastly, an important feature supported by the tool
is the playback functionality. This feature allows the analyst to replay any stored
data for key cyber attack indicators for future threat model development. To test
the tool, NMap was used to generate port scans [21]. The tool visualized the linear
port scanning vertical lines showing NMap’s attempt to search for vulnerable hosts.
Additional testing should be performed on the tool as only scanning techniques have
been visualized at this time. Figure 2.16 illustrates the tool in operation.

Figure 2.16: In [21], Riel et al. highlight the tool in operation.
The analyst controls the visualization through the control panel.
The coloring of the background can be modified based on user
preference.
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III. Research Methodology

T

his chapter outlines the research methodology used for the design and development of an efficient and effective visualization tool for aiding meaningful

visualizations that aid the analyst in developing SA. The problem definition and experimental goals are clearly defined following this introduction. The approach includes
specific details of the SA model, the IDS alert data, visualization toolkit and network
attack scenarios. The results of testing the visualization toolkit’s performance in each
network attack scenario is presented in Chapter IV.
3.1

Problem Definition
Computer networks and resources, both military and commercial, continue to

grow larger in terms of traffic flow, infrastructure, and available services. While
this is advantageous for the user, this trend puts additional strain on the already
overworked analysts that monitor the network environment. Traditionally, the analyst
uses IDSs to monitor the network traffic attempting to develop SA from the hundreds
to thousands of alert events generated each second. This method of network defense
and surveillance is quickly becoming unrealistic in practice as the analyst simply can
not keep pace with the increasing activity.
3.1.1

Goals and Hypothesis.

The goal of this research is to visualize the

correct network situation resulting in reduced cognitive strain on the analyst and
greater awareness. It is hypothesized that utilizing the Cyber SA Reference Model
in Section 3.2.1 can generate trusted SA. If this is true then the toolkit discussed in
Section 3.2.3 can accurately present a network situation that allows the analyst to
develop SA more effectively than the traditional method of strictly using IDSs.
3.2

Approach
The approach is to implement the necessary components of the Cyber SA Refer-

ence Model at the Level 2 of Situation Assessment in the Comprehension stage of SA,
see Section 2.3.3, to generate information visualization. Specifically in this research,
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the VIM toolkit is used visualize the generated fused IDS alert data. The analyst
will interact with the visualization(s) to form SA ultimately leading to a decision of
whether a network attack has occurred.
3.2.1

Cyber Situational Awareness Reference Model.

The Cyber SA Model

is the application of the SA Reference Model in the Network Domain, see Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1: In [27], Tadda et al. define the application of the
SA Reference Model discussed in Section 2.3.3 applied in the
Network Domain.
Multiple IDSs on the network generate the raw sensor data and to send it
to data collection repository. From the repository, the data streams into a parsing
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and data cleansing process that outputs unique, metadata objects that are labeled
evidence. This is a necessary step for two reasons. First, IDSs that share a subset of
attack signatures will output a similar event alert when triggered. Reducing the data
redundancy at this point in the system will ensure the Model Matching Algorithm
(MMA) is processing efficiently. Second, the data cleansing is the first opportunity
to remove false-positive alert events. The perception stage ends with the queuing of
the evidence into a evidence repository accessible by the MMA.
The Comprehension stage begins with the MMA fetching each new evidence and
determining the significance of it in relation to the algorithm’s threat model, network
configuration, and the mission. The decision process by the MMA is continuous until
a specific point is reached where the MMA fragments one of the containers. The
fracture point occurs when the MMA decides that the current evidence does not
support the current network threat stage. After the separation of information, the
MMA resumes its normal procedure of fetching, deciding, and placing new evidence
in the appropriate container. The separated container of information is sent to the
analyst’s visualization tool. The tool supports both Situation Assessment, as known
as the Level 2 of the JDL model, and the Comprehension stage. The tool will update
the visualization appropriately to reflect the new information.
The new information will affect the current SA. The analyst’s role is to answer
numerous questions:
1. Who caused the effect?
2. Who was impacted?
3. Where did the effect occur?
4. When did the effect occur?
5. How did the effect occur?
6. Is the effect related to past effects?
7. What was the effect?
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The analyst is cognitively thinking and answering the above questions while
searching for single and multiple stage attacks. The analyst is using the current SA
combined with a priori network knowledge of evolving network attacks, education,
experiences and known vulnerable targets. In this research, the analyst uses the tool
to find truth in the SA by filtering out the noise. The filtering will validate any
theories the analyst has about the SA. Any valid theories will motivate the analyst
to react appropriately and anticipate.
3.2.2

Fused IDS Alert Data.

The fused alert data is the evidence collected

during the network attack scenarios discussed in Section 3.2.4. The network attack
scenarios were run against a class B mock-network. Network structure details are in
Appendix A. IP addresses were changed but the network structure remained unaltered. The alert events were parsed, cleaned and given metadata. This is an essential
step to remove alert event redundancy, false-positives and low priority alerts. The
formatting of the alert data into metadata alert objects allows the MMA to handle a
heterogeneous source of data seamlessly and more efficiently. In this research, the IDS
alert sources were Snort, Dragon, IIS, and Apache [15, 16]. Figure 3.2 describes the
hierarchial structure of the fused alert dataset in Unified Modeling Language (UML).
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Figure 3.2: The class structure of the fused alert data. Each
attribute represents a metadata variable with exception of the
attribute collections. The collections represent the alert metadata objects that exist within the current metadata objects i.e:
a track object has many heterogeneous alert metadata objects.
The MMA implements the flow diagram illustrated in the Anatomy of a Hack
in [19]. With each piece of evidence, the MMA decides which methodology should
contain that evidence based on the evidence itself, the existing evidence in all of the
methodologies and how that evidence relates to the host/network configuration and
network mission. The MMA has the ability to remove, add and combine methodologies as the situation changes. A removal of methodology causes the evidence to be
aggregated into a track metadata object and to be sent to the toolkit for visualization.
3.2.3

Visualization Toolkit.

This research directly applies to the visualiza-

tion of Level 2, Situation Assessment, in the JDL model in Section 2.3.2. The level
2 is incorporated in the comprehension stage of the Cyber SA Reference model in
Section 3.2.1. The tool helps the analyst in the comprehension stage by offloading
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considerable cognitive processing through effective visualizations that incorporate additional network context not available in traditional IDS alerts such as friend/foe, IP
machine-type or tcpdump data. The analyst can apply his/her network knowledge
through the capabilities of the toolkit in order to gain trusted SA.
More specifically, the VIM toolkit was designed by Stanfield Systems, Inc.
In [25], Stanfield Systems, Inc. lists the following capabilities that aid the analyst
in developing SA in the network domain:
1. Select information sources
2. Apply transformation operations
3. Choose a visual layout
4. Specify relationships between information entities
5. Map information values to graphical attributes
3.2.3.1 System Architecture.

Figure 3.3 shows the VIM architecture

separated into 3 major sections; Enterprise, Transformation and Visualization. To
incorporate a new network data source into the toolkit, a new adaptor is required or
modification of an existing adaptor is required. The Enterprise layer handles the data
parsing from the fused alert data into the enterprise object model. The transformation layer handles the data operations that the analyst uses to modify the information
sources in the layouts. For example, the merge operation transforms two information
sources into a single source using a common attribute. After the information source
is loaded into the layout, the analyst will use the filter operator to transform the
information source according to the filter criteria. The analyst interacts with the
Visualization layer when he or she selects a layout or changes the layout. The visualization layer supports the focusing mechanism when the analyst cursors around the
visualization.
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Figure 3.3: Stanfield Systems, Inc. illustrate the Visualization
Information Management toolkit’s system architecture [26].
3.2.3.2 Data Model.

A data model was necessary in order to map the

XML metadata of the fused alerts to the enterprise objects required by the toolkit at
the adapter level in the system architecture. The data model resembles Figure 3.2.
Additionally, the model captured the relationships between the XML objects. During
the processing of the XML, the adaptor also builds a network graph representative of
the alert activity between the IP addresses. The network graph information allows
the analyst to use the graphical information layouts provided by the toolkit.
Early in the research, the tcpdump was the first adaptor created. This adaptor
processed the raw tcpdump data of the network attack scenario to visualize the network traffic to and from each IP. The second adaptor was the fused alert adaptor as
it was more complicated.
Having multiple data models each with an adaptor allows the analyst to bridge
more relationships between disparate network data that can not be accomplished by
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traditional methods. Future research can be done in the area of implementing more
adaptors to see if additional SA is gained.
3.2.3.3 Database.

Early into research and development of the toolkit,

a requirement for a database solution became apparent. With larger datasets spanning several hours, the toolkit’s performance noticeably reduced especially when the
analyst used multiple visualizations with other network data such as tcpdump. The
data model(s) became so large that the toolkit could not process the analyst’s inquiries into the visualization within a desired response time. To reduce the toolkit’s
reliance on the operating system’s RAM, this research developed a MySQL database
to store the data models of the tcpdump, fused alert data, and the IP network context data later in development. The rationale for this implementation change is that
the analyst can choose specific data within all the network data. The change gives
greater control to the analyst by allowing him/her to decide what data, how much
of it to load, and having all the data centrally located facilitated usability concerns
with multiple data sources. The loading of information sources became less tedious
as the analyst configures the toolkit to open a single connection to a database rather
than opening a flat file for each information source. The implementation did reduce
the toolkit’s reliance on main memory to store the data model(s).
Another benefit of the database is related information about the computer resources and network can be stored in the database. The related information is analystbased meaning the analyst created this information from his/her knowledge and experience on the job and stored this in the database. The analyst-based information can
be merged into the other network data to enhance them. Specifically, we created an
IP address table that stored information such as friend/foe and machine-type. Other
important data such as asset importance could be stored in the database that could
help the analyst focus on certain IP addresses more so than others. Additionally,
each scenario was stored in its own database so any data modified during the scenario
would not effect the behavior or results of other scenarios.
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3.2.4

Network Attack Scenarios.

We executed the network attack scenarios

on a simulated network, see Appendix A, very similar to the class B network corresponding to the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) in Rome, NY. The network
included typical activity of a military network such as applications, services and scans.
3.2.4.1 Basic CGI Overflow.

This attack represents a buffer overflow

exploit against a known script on an Apache web server, www.bprd.osis.gov. The
exploited script in this scenario is called petition. The petition script allows people
to sign their names in support of some arbitrary statement. The person’s signature is
stored in a MySQL database. When the cgi is exploited, the tables within the MySQL
database are queried.
3.2.4.2 CGI Attack with Chaff.

This attack uses the same target and

exploit as in Section 3.2.4.1 but the attacker sends sporadic requests from different
IPs that produce the same Snort signature as the attack in Section 3.2.4.1.
3.2.4.3 Data Exfiltration.

In this attack, the attacker sends a seem-

ingly official-looking email to several inside users. The email contains a word document with embedded macros. When the user opens the word document, the macro
runs. The macro locates all of the folders that have files in Word’s “Recent Files” list
then uploads the folder’s contents to a remote ftp server.
3.2.4.4 Phishing with Plug and Play Exploit.

In this attack, the at-

tacker sets up a website offering the visitor free “porn” if they sign up. The user is
allowed to choose their own username and password. When a user from OSIS visits
this site he supplies the same username and password that he uses to login to his
machine in the OSIS network.
The attacker sees that she has that information and tries to ssh to the same IP
as the request that supplied the username and password, using that same username
and password. Once logged in the attacker downloads a Windows exploit from her

43

ftp server. The exploit is a Plug and Play (PNP) exploit that gives the attacker a
command shell on a remote Windows machine without needing any login information. Once on the Windows host, the attacker located the user’s home folder (under
“Documents and Settings”) and ftp’s all the files located there to a remote server.
3.2.4.5 Firewall Misconfiguration.

In this scenario, the system ad-

ministrator is performing routine system maintenance on the network firewall and
accidentally brings down the firewall. After a few minutes, the administrator realizes
the error and restores the firewall back to its original settings. No network attack
occurs at this time, but background attackers, that are normally unsuccessful, gain
access to the IP enclaves inside the network that are supposedly protected by a firewall.
3.3

Test Suite Specifications
Below is a table that describes the necessary requirements of a system in order

to implement the visualization solution proposed in this research.
Table 3.1: The hardware and software test environment used to run the toolkit during experiments.
Component
Computer Make & Model
Processor Type
Processor Clock Speed
RAM Size
Operating System
Integrated Development Environment
Java Compiler
Other System Requirements
Additional plugins

Database

Value
Dell Latitude D820 laptop computer
TM
R Core
Intel°
Duo processor
2.16 GHz
4096 MB
Windows XP Professional
Eclipse 3.3.0
jre1.6.0
virtual machine arguments: -xmx1024M
WinPcap 4.0.1 and Jpcap 0.7
JAVA-HELP
MySQL JDBC support plugin
Fused Alert Dataset adapter plugin
MySQL Server 5.0
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3.4

Experimental Design
We tested the methodology in the following way. The researcher, acting as the

analyst using the toolkit, determined and outlined the precise steps required to build
a visualization that aids the analyst is building SA of the network attack scenario in
Section 3.2.4. Initially, the research was tasked with only visualizing the fused alert
data to the analyst. However, the data lacked the network context in order to aid the
analyst in developing SA from the visualization. Therefore other types of network
data were included, such as tcpdump and network host/configuration data, in order
to fill-in the information gaps evident in the fused alert data. Each scenario was
researched using the additional data to create visualizations that aided the analyst in
developing valuable SA.
3.5

Implementation
In order to achieve the goal of an analyst developing SA through the toolkit, it

had to be enhanced in several areas for it to be functional in this domain.
3.5.1

Software Engineering the Toolkit.

In order to visualize the network

situation from the fused alert data, the toolkit was engineered in the following ways.
Initially, the toolkit required network data files as input, specifically the fused alert
and tcpdump. For each type of network data, an adaptor is necessary in order to
parse and create the necessary objects and object relationships in the toolkit. The
adaptor is a key component of the toolkit. For example, the fused alert adaptor stores
the relationships within the XML metadata and establishes new relationships within
the data such as IP address associations. Multiple adaptors allows the analyst to
aggregate and visualize different data simultaneously to develop a finer picture of the
network activity.
Initially, the toolkit lacked the ability to link multiple visualizations together,
but now the analyst can link multiple visualizations together through a shared data
attribute. The data attribute most likely to be shared through all network data
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is the IP address. We found it necessary at least in the fused alert data that a
source and destination IP address is required. The visualizations can be linked bidirectionally thus the analyst can highlight any object within the visualizations and
the corresponding information in the other linked visualization will highlight.
Next, the toolkit filter was enhanced in several ways. First, the filter was modified to filter on any attribute within the fused alert data. This allows the analyst
more variability to manipulate the fused alert data even further for clarity. Second, the
toolkit executes an analyst’s filter request to all component-linked visualizations. This
enhancement provides the analyst with visualizations that include similarly-related
information. Before this enhancement, the filter would reduce the current visualization and none of the others. The difference in data presentation was distracting to
the analyst. Lastly, the filter was enhanced to include pattern recognition operators
to allow the analyst flexibility on filtering based on “key words” rather than specific
strings. For example, an analyst using the filter to search and match for specific terms
within an alert description versus matching the entire string.
Next, the toolkit was enhanced to handle the notion of time. The fused alert
data is parsed to create a linear timeline of alert creation. This is the foundation
for track timeline in future research. The analyst is able to set a time constraint to
further refine the data that is visualized.
Lastly, the analyst can assign different object shapes, colors, and borders based
on the object data attributes. For example, the analyst can assign squares and circles
to friendly IP addresses and enemy IP addresses respectively. The analyst may decide
to give certain colors to IP addresses or change the object border type of an IP
address based on IP address activity. This capability allows the analyst to decide
how the visualization should appear. An added benefit is that the analyst is more
likely to process information from the visualization faster because he/she designed
the color/shape legend for the visualization. The analyst isn’t interpreting another
person’s visualization but rather his/her own visualization.
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3.6

Summary
We specified an experimental methodology to determine if the VIM Toolkit can

benefit the analyst in developing sufficient SA in order to determine if a network
attack is occurring, the network attack progression and possibly label the type of
attack. The research would like to see the analyst gain benefits that include reduced
cognitive strain in the analyst, quicker response times to valid network attacks and
more efficient SA development within the analyst compared to the traditional method
of monitoring using IDSs. This chapter focused on the important factors related
to the methodology of the research. The next chapter presents the results of the
methodology.
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IV. Network Attack Scenario Analysis

T

his chapter presents the operational steps an analyst performs in order to gain
SA of the computer network. The goal is to create visualizations that aid the

analyst in developing SA. In regards to the network attack scenarios in this research,
the goal would be for the analyst to gain insight into the role of the attacker(s), the
victim(s) and any other actors in the domain. Another key indicator that the analyst
has SA of the computer network is if the analyst can understand the story of the
network attack.
This chapter contains step-by-step figures that show the analyst actively participating in a knowledge building exercise. The toolkit, without the aid of the analyst,
does not build SA. The analyst uses his/her knowledge, experience, and insight to
link and filter multiple visualizations until the underlining, key information is revealed
that, up to this point, has been obscured by abundant extraneous data.
The main scenario detailed in this research will be Phishing with Plug and
Play because it represents a multi-stage attack with multiple attackers and victims.
Additionally, the scenario represents the largest fused alert dataset available in the
research. However, there are several visualizations from other scenarios, such as the
Firewall Misconfiguration in Section 3.2.4.5, that will be highlighted to show SA of
the network. In particular, the analyst using the toolkit can determine if network
defenses are performing appropriately.
It is expected that the selected network attack scenario will be outlined in detail
starting with the loaded data and ending when the analyst has developed sufficient SA
from the scenario. The loading steps are found in the appendix and are not important
in this chapter.
4.1

Phishing with Plug and Play Exploit
The Figure 4.1 shows the beginning state of the toolkit. The analyst has con-

nected the toolkit to the database.
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Figure 4.1: The toolkit ready for the analyst to begin building
creating visualizations. The toolkit has already connected to
the database as evidence that the Information Sources box is
populated.
This network attack scenario requires the use of two information layouts; Treetable
and Force-Directed Graph. The analyst loads the scenario’s fused alert data into a
treetable information layout. Figure 4.2 shows the fused alert data loaded into the
treetable layout. The analyst does notice a pause in the toolkit as it works to process
the 257 tracks. Through proper visualization linking and filtering, the amount of data
will dramatically shrink and toolkit responsiveness will increase. At the conclusion
of the filtering process, there are 3 tracks associated with the actors involved in this
network attack.
All of the available information sources for visualization are located in the information sources box. It is not a requirement that the analyst utilize every information
source, but it should be noted that it is likely that the analyst will gain better understanding with access to more, unique sets of information from his/her environment.
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Figure 4.2:
The analyst has loaded the fused alert data into
the treetable layout. The data that is hierarchical in structure
is best represented in this layout.
Next, the analyst creates a second visualization using the force-directed graph
information layout. The analyst drags a panel separator into the visualization space to
split the space for a second layout. The analyst drags the force-directed graph layout
from the information layouts box into the empty visualization space. The selection of
which data to load into the force-directed layout requires some understanding of the
preprocessing procedures that occurred during the initial loading from the database.
The fused alert data was parsed to create two data sources, Nodes and Links, in
order to create a proper graph structure. The Nodes collection represents the IP
addresses and the Links collection represents the alerts shared between a pair of IP
addresses. Figure 4.3 is the progression of choices the analyst makes when defining
the force-directed graph information layout necessary to create the foundation of the
visualization.
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(a)

(e)

(b)

(c)

(f)

(d)

(g)

Figure 4.3: The information source of the force directed graph
must be hand-built by the analyst. The Nodes collection in
Figure 4.3a was merged with an outside network data source.
Specifically, the IPs collection contains IP address information
such as friend or foe. The merging of multiple data sources
enhances the analyst’s choices when visually defining the objects
in the visualization as seen in later figures. Figures 4.3d and 4.3g
represent required actions from choosing operations merge and
extend relations in Figures 4.3c and 4.3f respectively.
The resulting visualizations are shown in figure 4.4. The next figures outline
the process of linking the visualizations together, coloring the force-directed graph
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and filtering the visualizations properly. The linking and coloring steps can occur in

Figure 4.4:
In the force-directed graph, the rectangular objects are the IP addresses and the links connecting the IP addresses are the IDS alerts. A link between two IP addresses can
represent multiple alerts in the Fused IDS data therefore it is
very important that the two visualizations be linked together to
display that relationship.
any order. It is left to the analyst’s discretion which to do first. In this research, the
linking stage was done first because it was a fixed process. There is no deviation from
the mechanism that links the treetable visualization to the force-directed graph and
vice versa.
4.1.1

Component Linking the Visualizations.

Figure 4.5 shows to the re-

quired options for the linking of the treetable visualization to the force-directed visualization. The analyst selects the treetable visualization and tabs to the Component
linking box at the bottom of the toolkit.

52

Figure 4.5: In the component linking workspace, the analyst
selects the visualization he/she wants to link the currently selected visualization to. In this case, the force-directed graph
visualization is selected. Next, the analyst associates each alert
type source and destination IP address data attribute to the
address attribute in the force-directed visualization. After each
alert type is specified, the analyst clicks the apply button. Note,
the Apache IDS alerts do not specify a server IP address therefore rather than generalize where these alerts came from and
possibly skew results, this research chose to leave this data unspecified in the linking process.
Next, the toolkit allows the analyst bi-directional linking of visualizations. The
analyst may find key evidence in the force-directed graph visualization and having the
two visualizations linked allows the analyst to investigate which tracks are associated
with the evidence in the force-directed graph visualization. Having applied the linking
from the treetable visualization to the force-directed graph visualization, the analyst
should focus on the force-directed graph visualization and click the component linking
tab at the bottom of the toolkit in order to link in the opposite direction. Figure 4.6
shows the required options for the linking of the force-directed graph visualization to
the treetable visualization.
After applying the component linking options in bi-directionally, it is important
to test that in fact both visualizations are linked. Simply, select some objects in both
visualizations and look to see if the other visualization highlighted any data. At this
step, the visualizations still are large requiring the analyst to search the visualization
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Figure 4.6:
In the component linking workspace, the force
directed graph visualization differs slightly than the treetable
visualization. The force-directed graph visualization has two
objects, the nodes and links. It is important to link both because
they are focusable. To get the alerts between two linked IP
addresses, the analyst would click the link between those IP
addresses and not the IP nodes. If the analyst wanted all the
alerts associated with a specific IP address, the analyst would
click that IP node. Notice that the analyst can link the node
address attribute to the Apache Remote IP address attribute.
The benefit of this action is that the analyst can determine what
tracks hold Apache alerts.
space for the highlighted data. Figure 4.7 shows the analyst that his/her linking
options have been successfully implemented.
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Figure 4.7: The analyst selected a track within the treetable
visualization. The nodes and links corresponding to the selected
track become highlighted.
4.1.2

Object Configuration in the Force-Directed Graph Visualization.

The

object configuration in the visualization is highly subjective based on the analyst’s
preferences. There are no restrictions on what colors, shapes or borders to implement
in the visualization however there are choices that follow more logical standards. The
goal is to visualize unique and important details that help the analyst quickly process
information without him/her focusing on each individual node. Object configurations
allow the analyst to focus in on certain details or patterns that would otherwise be
hidden.
4.1.2.1 Object Shapes.

Figure 4.8 depicts the analyst’s object shape

selections within the object properties display tab. There are not many shapes available to the analyst due to several factors. First, the visualization is unfocused until
the user focuses by clicking on an object within the visualization. When unfocused,
objects tend to lose structural characteristics for example the octagon becomes vi55

Figure 4.8:
The analyst chooses friendly IP addresses as
squares and non-friendly IP addresses as ellipses. The diamonds
are the important IP addresses that reside in the inner enclave
of the network behind the firewall.
sually similar to an ellipse. Future research could develop better, more descriptive
shapes. Second, the java object rendering that the toolkit implements requires significant coding in order to build the shapes.
The resulting force-directed graph visualization is shown in Figure 4.9 below.
The resulting visualization is an improvement, yet the addition of object colors would
greatly enhance recognition of patterns, trends or attacks. The next selection will
detail the object colors utilized in this research.
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Figure 4.9: The objects are very distinguishable from one another. The analyst is able to visually discern known, trusted IPs
from unknown remote IPs. Note that the unknown IP addresses
are treated as foe until the analyst determines otherwise. The
analyst after analysis on such an IP address can modify the state
attribute in the node and the toolkit will make the appropriate
object display property changes.
4.1.2.2 Object Colors.

For the object colors, the analyst decided on a

color scheme that of a threat assessment or vulnerability report. Figure 4.10 outlines
the object colors chosen.
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Figure 4.10: The IP addresses are that friendly were colored
green. The background scanners and attackers were colored orange because they are attackers but not successful. The IP addresses they are targeting are non-responsive. The research sees
the color Orange as an escalation of concern. The IP addresses
colored red are valid, successful attackers. The IP addresses colored in yellow represent cyber attack victims. The IP addresses
with no coloring are further emphasis that their status is unknown at this time. If this were real-time the analyst would
have little time to research the intentions of unknown IP addresses therefore an off-line research team would do additional
information gathering on unknown IP addresses to indicate a
shape or color change. Lastly, the analyst chose to set the object
shape’s border type to the thinnest setting to allow for better
shape distinction.
Figure 4.11 shows the resulting visualization. The analyst is gaining more information about the network with each configuration. The next section will define
the object border types specific to this scenario.
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Figure 4.11:
After assigning different colors to each actor in
the domain, the analyst gains additional insight into the area of
the network he/she should be focusing. In particular, there are
two known attackers associated to a known friendly of which is
associated to the known victim who resides inside the protected
enclave. One of the attackers has two-way alert communication
with the known friendly, the other attacker has one-way alert
communication. Lastly, this scenario is not a single stage attack
because of the friendly IP address that resides between the attackers and the victim. Also, the attackers do not have direct
communication to the victim giving further evidence that this
attack is more sophisticated.
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4.1.2.3 Object Border Types.

Lastly, object border types were utilized

to demonstrate activity of actor. The attackers, background attackers, and steppingstone friendly IPs in this scenario were given different borders to further distinguish
them from the other actors. Figure 4.12 details the border configuration for three
actors in the domain. The distinction helps the analyst visually differentiate between
background attackers and scanners. The bordering puts additional emphasis on the
attackers and the stepping-stone or source of the second stage of this cyber attack.
Figure 4.13

Figure 4.12:
Assigning the dashed line border to the background attackers and attackers represents that the actor is an
active entity. The enlarging and red coloring of the friendly IP
address labeled a stepping-stone to signify the source of the next
stage in the attack.
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Figure 4.13:
Upon examining the visualization, the redbordered friendly node is to signify to the analyst that the box
may or may not be fully compromised but nevertheless it is the
source of the next stage in the progression of the cyber attack.
The red bordering makes the node in the visualization stand
out from all the others further emphasizing its importance. The
nodes with dashed borders are attackers. The analyst can determine exactly how many background attackers and scanners
there are in the scenario.
Allowing the analyst to assign object display properties based on object node
attributes within the visualization is an extremely helpful and effective tool in developing SA. The analyst no longer is required to focus on object within the visualization
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in order to determine various properties of the object. Instead, the analyst visually
processes the object’s properties and begins to see activity patterns within the visualization. The next section discusses the toolkit’s filtering of the visualizations so the
analyst can focus on developing SA.
4.1.3

Filtering the Visualizations.

Figure 4.13 is a visualization that rep-

resents the 257 tracks in the treetable visualization. Having linked the visualizations
together, the analyst filters the treetable visualization. The analyst should be more
concerned with the key actors in the domain. They are background scanners, background attackers, attackers, and victims therefore the analyst filters the track data
for machine types similar to that criteria. The filter results produces 43 tracks in the
treetable visualization. Figure 4.14 shows the resulting force-directed graph visualization after the filtering. The analyst is able to focus immediately on the important
part of this visualization seen in Figure 4.15.

Figure 4.14:
The visualization representing the treetable visualization after it has been cleaned of cluttered data.
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Figure 4.15: The analyst is focusing attention in this area of
the visualization. This area shows the relationships that each
actor has with the other.

Figure 4.16: Using the toolkit, the analyst cleans the remaining data to show only the attackers, victims and one unknown.

The analyst uses the toolkit to focus closer into this area using the filter. Figure 4.16 shows the force-directed visualization after the analyst focuses on the victim
and attackers using the filter to explicitly filter for machine-type equal to victim or
attacker but not background in order to exclude background attackers.
Figure 4.17 shows the analyst three expanded tracks that are related to the
nodes and links in the force-directed graph visualization. Take note that the analyst
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Figure 4.17:
The analyst expands the three tracks to their
fullest to reveal the important alerts that are associated to the
nodes and links in the force directed graph visualization.
started with 257 tracks that held tens of thousands of alerts and the analyst has ended
this filter process with three tracks and fewer than 50 alerts.
4.1.4

Analysis of the Visualizations.

After configuring the visualizations and

filtering them accordingly, the analyst can analysis the two visualizations to attempt
to create a storyline of the network attack. The goal is to have the analyst create
SA from these visualizations. If the analyst can put together a storyline of events
that are based on truth then he/she comprehended what occurred and in the process
gained valuable SA.
The analyst starts with the force-directed graph visualization because he/she
can focus on a node or link and have the corresponding alerts in the treetable highlight.
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This is the easier approach then attempting to sift through the numerous alerts in
the treetable visualization.
To begin, the analyst highlights either attacker. The attacker usually initiates
the cyber attack. The analyst is looking at the timestamps of each highlighted alert
to determine which attacker initiated the attack. Figure 4.18 shows the highlighted
attacker who initiated the attack on the first victim.

Figure 4.18:
The analyst focuses on the attacker node representing IP address 165.17.8.126 which highlights the dragon
alert from 165.17.8.126 to the first victim, 100.20.3.127, in track
16. The alert is a porn alert so its unclear at the moment if
100.20.3.127 is compromised and if so, how it is compromised
because there are no other alerts at this time.
The analyst focuses on the second attacker node in the force-directed graph
visualization. The alerts corresponding to the attacker highlight in the treetable
visualization. Figure 4.19 shows the analyst processing on the force-directed graph
visualization and how his/her focus switches to the treetable visualization with the
aid of the toolkit.
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Figure 4.19: The analyst focuses on the attacker node representing IP address 51.251.22.183 which highlights 2 dragon alerts
indicating bi-directional communication between 51.251.22.183
to the first victim, 100.20.3.127. The alerts are of Secure Shell
(SSH) origin so the unauthorized attacker, 51.251.22.183, has
opened a secure connection to the first victim. It is unclear at
this point how the unauthorized IP address obtained the username and password to open a successful SSH connection, but
immediately the analyst knows the first victim has been compromised. The unauthorized user has the same user privileges
as the authorized user on 100.20.3.127.
At this stage, the way in which the unauthorized user obtained the username and
password is unknown so the analyst would notify other network security professionals.
The analyst searches the force directed graph visualization for any evidence that the
attacker has compromised the host machine, 100.20.3.127. Figure 4.20 shows the two
alerts associated with the compromise.
It is obvious at this point that the attacker has compromised the machine and
potentially has access to any other machines connected to it. Level of access would
depend on the level of access that the compromised user on 100.20.3.127 has. The files
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Figure 4.20:
The analyst notices the SID number 1292 referenced in both Snort alerts and researches it using a search
engine. Perhaps the analyst already knows the signature referenced by this SID number. The alert is associated with postcompromise behavior indicating the use of Windows Directory
listing tools. The attacker used an exploit to gain a command
shell to execute a dir command. He/She is attempting to gain
additional information on any vulnerable electronic documents
on the host machine.
on the server at 100.10.20.9 is compromised after the attacker downloads the files from
it to 100.20.3.127. From 100.20.3.127, the attacker ftps the files from 100.20.3.127 and
100.10.10.9 to 92.6.85.108 as evidenced by Figure 4.21.
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Figure 4.21:
The analyst focuses on IP address 92.6.85.108.
Nine dragon alerts were generated due to unauthorized SSH
connections from 100.20.3.127 to 92.6.85.108. The analyst concludes that the attacker ftp’d the files to this IP address.
After the attack, they would do a follow-up investigation that involves interrogation on the authorized user of 100.10.3.127. The user would explain his/her unauthorized usage of government property to access an unauthorized porn website. The
investigation would conclude that the attacker at 51.251.22.183 used the information
gained from the website to open an SSH connection to the user’s machine.
4.1.4.1 Summary.

The PNP exploit cyber attack scenario was de-

scribed in detail. First, the loading of the information sources to create the necessary
visualizations was discussed. Second, the force directed graph visualization was configured to map colors and shapes to important data attributes within the visualization.
The colors and shapes allowed the analyst to process key patterns and relationships
quickly. Next, the visualizations were linked together bi-directionally to allow the
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analyst to view associated data across them. Lastly, the filter was utilized to reduce
the information sources within the visualization to a humanly-manageable level.
All of these steps enabled the analyst to step through the scenario smoothly.
The analyst was able to recognize the beginning of the scenario and follow the attacker
as he/she moved from his/her origin into the first victim machine then cause a second
machine to be a victim and ultimately succeed by ftp-ing the files off-site.
4.2

Research Observations
In this section, key observations from different scenarios will be highlighted to

demonstrate the toolkit’s effectiveness in visualizing the SA for the analyst.
4.2.0.2 Roles of Actors.

The force-directed graph visualization when

configured using the visualization setup outlined in Section 4.1.2 effectively visualizes
the scenario parameters that this research effort was given in the form of artifacts.
Specifically, the role and success of each actor was accurately portrayed by the visualization. For example, this research knows that background scanners are solely
reconnaissance efforts therefore the analyst should not see two-way IDS alert communication between a scanner and a network asset. Figure 4.23 illustrates an example
of the scanning activity. The analyst can examine the alerts by focusing on the link
between the outside scanner and an inside asset.

Figure 4.22: The analyst views directed alerts from an outside
threat to several inside assets.
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Figure 4.23: The analyst focuses on the background scanner
node within the force directed graph visualization to highlight
the linked alerts in the treetable visualization. Snort has generated the alerts based on the scanner using NMAP’s ICMP
Pinging attempts to leak information unsuccessfully from the
target IP address.
4.2.0.3 Visualizing Network Activity.

The analyst can utilize the

toolkit to determine if the current network activities being visualized are normal or
abnormal. Specifically, the analyst loads the firewall misconfiguration scenario in Section 3.2.4.5 demonstrating that the visualizations can aid the analyst in determining
if the proper protections and/or procedures are executing properly on the network.
Using the visualization setup outlined in Chapter IV, Figure 4.24 shows a dramatic
increase in alert activity of the background scanners and attackers. The background
scanners and attackers have access to the Inner enclave, represented as green diamonds
in the visualization.
The analyst is alerted to a possible misconfiguration because normally the background scanners and attackers appear as shown in Figure 4.25.
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Figure 4.24: The analyst focuses on the on an unknown node
that generated 571 alerts to friend IP addresses as well as several IP addresses within the inner enclave. The Snort alerts are
NMAP ICMP PING. The unknown node is behaving similarly
to that of background scanners. The unknown node has visible
alert links to the inner enclave represented as green diamond
objects. The firewall should have prevented the connection between unknown, background attackers and scanners to the inner
enclave. This is a definite flag that the firewall protecting the
inner enclave is setup improperly.
The analyst having researched the alert activity of the unknown node can modify
the IP address’s machine type attribute to accurately reflect its true motivations. The
unknown node is a background scanner and should be labeled as such. Figure 4.26
illustrates the end result of the analyst relabelling the unknown node as a background
scanner.
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Figure 4.25: The normal activity of background scanners and
attackers seen in the other cyber attack scenarios that have a
properly configured firewall. There is a dramatic difference in
activity between the background scanners and attackers in this
figure compared to the activity of Figure 4.26.
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Figure 4.26:
The analyst relabels the unknown node as a
background scanner because he/she has sufficient evidence to
conclude that it is a background scanner. The analyst focused
on the unknown node and the linked alerts in the treetable displayed that in fact the alerts generated by the unknown node
where of the same type typically generated by background scanners. This scanner used NMAP to IP sweep all available friendly
IP addresses that were available to the scanner in order gain
important network information such as available services or Operating System versions. Notice that toolkit automatically refreshes the object display properties of the visualization to register the analyst’s action. The node changed from white to orange
to indicate an increase in threat.
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V. Conclusions

T

his chapter presents a summary of the research conducted and conclusions from
the analysis provided in Chapter 4. Significance of the research, contributions

and areas for future research is discussed.
5.1

Research Summary and Conclusions
Network analysts use intrusion detection systems as the traditional method

to defend computer networks and resources against network attacks. The difficulty
to defend against such attacks increases as networks and bandwidth have become
larger allowing greater client usage. Network analysts employ several IDSs in an
attempt to gain a better understanding of the current situation yet in reality, the
high priority attacks are obscured by the large volume of low priority scan alerts,
false-positive and redundant event alerts. Additionally, network analysts are unable
to cognitively process the IDS alerts at the rate required in order to gain truthful
Situational Awareness. Lastly, IDSs do not facilitate the effort required of analysts
to associate disparate alerts into a multi-stage attack. This research proposed using
the SA Reference Model to increase the Situation Awareness for network analysts.
Specifically, the raw event alerts generated by the IDSs are cleaned and catalogued
into collections by a parsing algorithm. Those collections feed into VIM, a software
system, in order to visualize the network activity.
The research investigated the use of visualizations to enhance a network analyst’s ability to gain Situational Awareness relating to network activity. Allowing the
analyst flexibility in visualization and display property selection aided the analyst in
developing SA. The research concluded the development of SA is an active process
between the analyst and the toolkit. The analyst configures the visualization(s) to
his or her preference then uses the powerful filters to reduce the visualization into
a meaningful picture. The analyst was able to filter tens of thousands of IDS alerts
into a small subset of key alerts related to the attack. The research found that the
fused alert data alone was unable to provide the analyst the network context required
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in order to develop SA. This research found that the integration of other network
data in conjunction with the fused alert data was more effective in building the SA.
Lastly, the research was able to produce many of the parameters of the experiment
visually. For example, the research was able to visualize the incorrect configuration
of the network firewall. Using the visualization, the analyst was able to see that there
was something wrong. The analyst saw background scanners having access to the
inner enclave of the network which was supposedly protected.
5.2

Research Limitations
The research was limited in several ways which were not realized until later in the

process. The analyst gains SA by being presented factual information that is pertinent
to the existing situation. The analyst uses the information in conjunction with his
or her own knowledge and experience having been monitoring the network previously
to build the SA. The research utilized fused alert data from a mock network based
on a existing network, referenced in Appendix A. The researcher had no experience
with the real network therefore no reference ability to make decisions for questions
such as what are the critical assets of the network or is this alert load between two
IP addresses significant? Many more questions arise during this SA building exercise
but as an outside analyst, the researcher is unable to provide the answers. The
research was given five scenarios in order to develop this reference ability which was
deficient. Given an analyst with more experience on the network in which the fused
alert data is derived, the SA-forming process is more efficient and effective. Next, the
fused alert data at the track level was not very helpful in and of itself. Of the four
track attributes it contained, two of those attributes rarely changed in terms of value
leaving the research having to work with the IDS alerts within those tracks. Next,
for each scenario, the tracks were not given a timestamp. The MMA generates tracks
simultaneously but it feeds a track to the toolkit when it has determined that the
track is complete. It was extremely difficult to generate a timeline of track creation
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with no timestamp. Having that timeline could of been another indication to the
analyst that something significant was occurring.
5.3

Future Work
There are several things that can be achieved in future efforts. Further testing

is required using more scenarios with an analyst that is familiar with the testing environment specifically the network, referenced in Appendix A, that produced the alerts
used in the fused alert data. The toolkit supports the notion of time therefore more
effort should be focused on updating the visualizations through time. Timestamping
the tracks would be very beneficial so that the treetable visualization updates accordingly with the other graph-like visualizations. Next, is to make the toolkit a real-time
system. This requires the MMA pushing the tracks into the toolkit’s database and
having the database push those changes to the toolkit or have the toolkit query for
new updates based on the analyst’s current configuration. Next, the object shapes
need to be redone. Using Java2D is limiting especially when designing new shapes.
The use of the image icons would be more beneficial and the focusing to see the
object’s data would be handled the same. The analyst does not need to view the
data contents of the objects after he or she has assigned object display properties.
Next, a redesign of the toolkit’s bottom panel that includes the component-linking
and object display properties is required. The process of assigning the constraints on
the visualizations is time-consuming and is distracting. Next, research into hardware
acceleration is available to increase the performance of the toolkit. Finally, follow-on
research is necessary to metrically determine the benefit of SA development with the
VIM toolkit versus SA development without the VIM toolkit. This would involve
real-time usability testing with experienced analysts.
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Appendix A. Computer Network Testing Background
A.1

Network Infrastructure
The computer network used to run the cyber attack scenarios against is a fic-

tional network based on a real network named Open Source Information System
(OSIS). It is an unclassified network used by the Intelligence Community to share
sensitive-but-unclassified information. OSIS is primarily a network for the display of
finished intelligence product, rather than a source of collaboration or collection. The
model of network is simulated by a testbed of approximately 20 physical machines.
The testbed includes real hosts (clients and servers) and network infrastructure components (routers, hubs and firewalls); and several hundred virtual hosts simulated by
traffic generation machines. The simulated OSIS is connected to a model Internet,
which is simulated by two other traffic generation machines. The actual structure of
the complete OSIS-Internet model is given in Figure A.1 and Figure A.2 below.

Figure A.1:

The infrastructure of the OSIS network.
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Figure A.2: The infrastructure of the notional OSIS network
that consists of an internet-connected backbone combined with
several fictional Intelligence communities.
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Appendix B. Connecting the Toolkit to the Database
This appendix includes the steps leading up to choosing an information layout. As
soon as the information sources are loaded, the analyst can choose an information
layout to visualize the information source.

Figure B.1:

The status of the toolkit when it starts up.

Figure B.2:
Analyst right-clicks the information source area
and chooses to add data source.
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Figure B.3: Choosing to load an information source will cause
this pop-up selection menu in upper left corner of the workspace.
The darkened choice is the adaptor to load the fused alert
database.

Figure B.4:
Prompt for analyst to enter in the connection
information to connect to the database.
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Figure B.5: All the tables within the database are available.
The analyst selects whichever database tables he or she prefers.

Figure B.6: The database tables are present in the information
source box ready to be loaded into an information layout
At this point, the analyst is ready to choose the information layout. Chapter IV includes a detailed example of loading information layouts and designing the
visualization.
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